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Richard A. Starr* 
Net Neutrality: On Mobile Broadband Carriers and 
the Open Internet, the Commercially Reasonable 
Network Management Standard, and the Need for 
Greater Protection of the Open Internet 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
Net neutrality is the idea that the internet should be open and free.1 Supporters 
of net neutrality agree that entrepreneurs should have “the same chance to succeed 
as established corporations,” and that the government should not allow Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”) to restrict access to any website in order to make room 
for more advertisements.2 However, one of the main problems historically faced by 
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in deciding how to protect the 
open internet has been whether mobile broadband providers should be subject to 
the same regulations as traditional fixed broadband providers.3 The FCC’s 2010 
Open Internet Order (“2010 Order”) regulated how ISPs could manage data,4 and 
ordered that mobile broadband service providers5 could not block lawful internet 
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 1. Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 10, 
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality. 
 2. Id. ISPs are the entities that provide residential and commercial customers with the ability to connect 
through the internet via traditional telephone lines (dial-up), cable and DSL (broadband), or mobile broadband 
services. What are Internet Service Providers?, COMCAST http://www.xfinity.com/resources/internet-service-
providers.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,192 (Sept. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts 0 and 
8). The order covered both “mobile” and “wireline” providers, which offer internet services to cellular and 
residential consumers, respectively. 
 5. What are Internet Service Providers?, supra note 3 (commenting that wireline broadband involves 
providing internet service via wired cable or DSL connections to a home or business customer). 
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content, must disclose the methods of network management and the commercial 
terms of service, and must manage broadband traffic without imposing 
unreasonable discrimination.6 However, the 2010 Order did not apply the no 
unreasonable discrimination rule to mobile broadband networks because the 
mobile broadband market was more competitive and more rapidly evolving than 
the established wireline broadband networks.7 
In 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“DC 
Circuit”) partially struck down the FCC’s authority to promulgate the 2010 Order 
because some sections of the 2010 Order contravened express statutory mandates.8 
In response, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler sought to revamp the Commission’s 
stance on net neutrality.9 The FCC subsequently released a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (“NPRM”),10 proposing to re-establish the anti-blocking provisions of 
the 2010 Order and implementing a “commercially reasonable” standard applicable 
to wireline broadband services. The NPRM sought comment on whether to regulate 
mobile broadband equally.11 After receiving public comment, Chairman Wheeler 
announced in early February 2015 that the commission would vote on whether to 
reclassify all broadband services– both wired and mobile–under Title II of the 
Communications Act of 1934, or regulate the services upon an alternate legal 
foundation.12 The Commission voted, and in April of 2015, the FCC promulgated 
its final rule (“2015 Final Order”), which classifies wired and mobile broadband 
services under Title II, but does not require compliance with all of the “utility-style” 
provisions.13 Further, the 2015 Final Order maintains a “reasonable network 
management” standard for evaluating compliance with the new, stricter rules on a 
case-by-case basis.14 
This comment defends the Commission’s decision to regulate wired and mobile 
broadband services equally, a position that will only grow stronger as the world 
 6. Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,192–93. 
 7. Id. at 59,192. 
 8. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (2014). Specifically, the Verizon court upheld the Commission’s 
Transparency rule, but struck down the no unreasonable discrimination rule and  anti-blocking provisions. Id. 
 9. Statement by FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler on the FCC’s Open Internet Rules, FCC.GOV (Feb 19, 
2014), http://www.fcc.gov/document/statement-fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-fccs-open-internet-rules. 
 10. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,464 (proposed July 1, 2014) (to be 
codified as 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). 
 11. Id. at 37,448-49. 
 12. Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler: This is How we will Preserve Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 4, 
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality/. 
 13. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,742 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified as 47 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, and 20). 
 14. Id. at 19,752. The Commission also specifically points out that broadband services may be subject to 
enforcement of sections 201 and 202 of the Telecommunications Act on a case-by-case basis because they are 
now classified under Title II generally, but that these adjudications are not to be applied in a way that allows the 
Commission to adopt ex ante rate regulations. Id. at 19,810. 
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becomes more interconnected.15 Additionally, this comment expands upon and 
defends the Commission’s reasoning behind its rejection of the 2014 NPRM’s 
commercially reasonable standard as a means of regulating network management 
practices.16 
PART II: BACKGROUND ON NET NEUTRALITY 
Though a new concept to many Americans,17 net neutrality has become a critical 
rights issue as the debate over net neutrality places internet freedom at the forefront 
of our politics.18 After the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit struck down the 
major provisions of the FCC’s 2010 Order,19 the FCC proposed a new set of 
regulations as part of its 2014 NPRM.20 After the 2014 NPRM, Americans were 
exposed to a great deal of information about net neutrality and what it means for 
consumers, as late night talk shows and blogs throughout the media provided 
widespread coverage of the issue.21 As a result of this incredible attention, between 
May and September of 2014, the FCC received over 3.7 million comments on the 
NPRM.22 The commentary in response to the FCC’s 2014 NPRM also nearly 
unanimously supported a federal policy that adheres to basic net neutrality 
principles.23 Indeed, President Barack Obama weighed in, explaining that the open 
internet “is essential to the American economy and increasingly to our very way of 
life.”24 Americans are deeply invested in the internet experience,25 and know that 
without the protections of net neutrality, internet users could be forced to pay more 
for slower service. 
A. The 2014 NPRM and 2015 Final Order 
 15. See infra Part IV.B. 
 16. See infra Part IV.C. 
 17. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
Professor Wu coined the term “net neutrality” with this article. 
 18. What is Net Neutrality?, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/feature/what-net-
neutrality (last visited Dec. 13, 2015). 
 19. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 20. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448 (proposed July 1, 2014) (to be 
codified as 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). 
 21. Ben Brody, How John Oliver Transformed the Net Neutrality Debate Once and for All, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
26, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-02-26/how-john-oliver-transformed-the-net-
neutrality-debate-once-and-for-all. 
 22. Edward Wyatt, Net Neutrality Comments to FCC Overwhelmingly One-Sided, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 
2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/net-neutrality-comments-to-f-c-c-overwhelmingly-one-sided-
study-says/. The 3.7 million comments received more than doubled the prior record of 1.4 million complaints 
the FCC received after Janet Jackson’s “wardrobe malfunction” in the Super Bowl halftime show in 2004. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, supra note 1. 
 25. See infra Part.IV.A. 
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In the 2014 NPRM, the FCC proposed that fixed broadband providers be allowed to 
charge content creators for access to faster internet lanes, but with three key 
provision comprising a “reasonable network management” standard.26 First, the 
NRPM implemented a transparency rule requiring that ISPs share performance 
reports detailing internet speed and congestion and instances of blocking content.27 
Second, a no-blocking rule prohibited ISPs from outright blocking legal content for 
any reason.28 Finally, the Commission’s proposal banned “commercially 
unreasonable practices” that, considering a totality of the circumstances, “threaten 
to harm internet openness and all that it protects.”29 According to the Commission, 
these three rules were meant to establish “reasonable network management” 
standards to promote internet openness.30 However, the commission exempted 
mobile broadband providers from the commercially unreasonable practices 
standard, consistent with its policy in the 2010 Open Internet Order.31 The FCC 
based its reasoning for the decision on “the rapidly evolving nature of mobile 
technologies, the increased amount of consumer choice, and operational 
constraints” of mobile networks.32 As the Commission has since reasoned, though, 
mobile and wired broadband should be on equal footing. 
In its Final Order in April of 2015, the Commission overhauled its point of view, 
and decided to regulate wired and mobile broadband providers using the same legal 
standards.33 Importantly, the FCC rejected the use of the commercially reasonable 
standard, but otherwise retained and even strengthened its stance on what 
constitutes reasonable network management practices.34 In rejecting the 
commercially reasonable standard, the FCC focused on protecting the internet 
experience of consumers or edge providers rather than on evaluating the 
agreements between Internet Service Providers.35 In lieu of the NRPM’s 
“commercially reasonable practices” standard, the 2015 Order implemented a more 
 26. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,456, 37,462 (proposed July 1, 2014) (to 
be codified as 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). In the 2014 NPRM, the Commission recognized that the 2010 transparency rule, 
no blocking rule, and unreasonable discrimination rule would contribute to the development of the scope of 
reasonable network management. Id. 
 27. Id. at 37,456. 
 28. Id. at 37,448. 
 29. Id. at 37,464. This standard is also referred to as the commercially reasonable standard throughout this 
comment. 
 30. Id. at 37,456. 
 31. Id. at 37,466. 
 32. Id. at 37,460. 
 33. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (April 13, 2015) (to be codified at 47 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, and 20). The FCC discusses the fact that the significant increase in widespread use of mobile 
broadband networks requires equal application of the rules. 
 34. Id. at 19,758. 
 35. Indeed, the 2015 Order adopted an overall governing standard that “makes clear that the standard is 
not limited to whether a practice is agreeable to commercial parties.” Id.  
 Richard A. Starr 
Vol. 11, No. 1 2016 93 
stringent standard of network management that prevents unreasonable interference 
or disadvantage that harms consumers and edge providers.36 
The following synopsis of the net neutrality debate gives context to the reasoning 
behind the FCC’s regulatory policies, why it supports regulating mobile and 
wireline broadband under the same framework, along with the stronger network 
management standard implemented in the Final Order. 
B. The Basics of the Net Neutrality Debate 
There are four major actors involved in the Net Neutrality debate: (1) backbone 
networks; (2) end users; (3) broadband providers; and (4) edge providers.37 
Backbone networks are comprised of multiple facilities across the country that 
transmit data over long distances through interconnected via fiber optic links and 
industrial–speed routers.38 End users, such as residential consumers, get access to 
these networks through local access broadband providers like Verizon that operate 
the last mile of data transmission.39 Finally, edge providers create or offer content or 
services on the internet/web.40 Therefore, end users looking to view content on the 
web seek out edge providers that then break down that content into packets of 
information.41 Those packets are then carried by the edge provider’s local access 
broadband provider to the backbone network, where they are carried to the end 
user’s local access broadband provider, whom then transmits the packets of 
information to the end user.42 Those concerned about the FCC’s commercially 
reasonable standard are worried about the relationship between broadband and 
edge providers, and argue that under the new standard, broadband providers could 
block end user access to edge providers, or slow down an end user’s access to 
various content.43 
C. Opposing Sides 
Two popular opinions frame the net neutrality debate with regard to the standard 
for assessing a broadband network’s compliance with open internet principles. 
Until the Final Order was issued in April of 2015, net neutrality advocates 
maintained that the commercially reasonable practices standard utilized in the 2014 
NPRM was too loose a standard, and would give too much lee-way to mobile ISPs 
 36. Id. at 19,740. 
 37. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 38. Margaret Rouse, Backbone Definition, TECHTARGET, 
http://searchtelecom.techtarget.com/definition/backbone (last visited Dec. 13, 2015). 
 39. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628–29. 
 40. Id. at 629. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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to implement practices that could exclude content providers and restrict end user 
access to the open internet.44 On the other hand, industry lawyers and other anti–
neutrality advocates argue that network management rules are often inappropriate 
for the technological challenges commonplace in the mobile broadband industry.45 
As part of the FCC’s efforts to balance these concerns, the 2015 Final Order rejects 
the commercially reasonable standard and instead requires “no unreasonable 
interference or unreasonable disadvantage to consumers or edge providers.”46 Part 
IV.A of this comment argues that the Commission properly decided to regulate 
mobile and fixed broadband providers in a manner that seeks to provide end users 
with substantially the same internet experience by creating a generalized network 
management standard that applies to both forms of internet service.47 Part IV.B 
argues that the Commission properly rejected the commercially reasonable 
standard.48 Part VI.C maintains that the Commission properly assessed the 
comments made pursuant to the 2014 NPRM in developing the no unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard announced in the 2015 Final Order, which 
provides a clear, enforceable directive to mobile broadband providers that focuses 
on the consumer’s internet experience.49 
PART III: LEGAL HISTORY 
A. The Origin of Title II and Common Carrier Status 
In 1892, the Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co.50 established the core directive that: 
[T]he principles of the common law applicable to common 
carriers. . .demanded little more than that they should carry for all persons 
who applied, in the order in which the goods were delivered at the 
 44. Id. See also Adam Bender, ‘Open Access’ Definitions Differ Among Carriers, Lobby Groups, Comm. Daily, 
2008 WLNR 421482 (Westlaw) (explaining that “open platform” is defined by the FCC as one that gives 
consumers the right to use any equipment, content, application, or service without discrimination by the 
carrier). 
 45. See Fran Berkman, Title II is the Key to Net Neutrality–So What is it?, DAILYDOT (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/what-is-title-ii-net-neutrality-fcc/. 
 46. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,740 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 47 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, and 20). The new rule also includes guiding factors for applying the rule in the future on a case-
by-case basis, to be discussed in more detail below. 
 47. See infra Part IV.A. 
 48. See infra Part IV.B. 
 49. See infra Part IV.C. 
 50. 145 U.S. 263 (1892). 
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particular station, and that their charges for transportation should be 
reasonable.51 
In response, Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”),52 
which codified those common law principles.53 
The 1934 Act has been at the epicenter of the net neutrality debate because it 
established both the FCC and modern common carrier principles.54 In Title I of the 
1934 Act, Congress set out the general provisions, and provided the FCC with 
regulatory power over all forms of electronic communication “so as to make 
available . . . to all people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient . . . radio 
communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges False”55 
Mobile broadband services generally fell under Title I’s Section 152(a) jurisdictional 
authority over “all interstate and foreign communications by wire or radio.”56 
In Title II of the 1934 Act, Congress codified common carrier law, and furnished 
the FCC with the authority to prevent common carriers from giving “undue or 
unreasonable preference of advantage to any person or class of persons.”57 For 
mobile broadband services, this meant that Title II afforded far greater and more 
explicit authority to the FCC to develop regulations that strictly prevent ISPs from 
charging edge providers for access to faster lanes of internet traffic. However, the 
FCC did not explicitly classify either mobile or wireline broadband internet services 
under Title II until the 2015 Final Order.58 
By the mid-20th Century, court decisions and FCC proceedings narrowed the 
definition of the common carrier. First, in National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners v. FCC,59 the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit found “the 
primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public character, which 
arises out of the undertaking to carry for all people indifferently.”60 As 
communications technologies became more advanced, the FCC had to examine the 
differences between private and common carriers, and decide which common 
 51. Id. at 275. 
 52. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). Importantly, the Communications Act of 1934 also replaced the Federal Radio 
Commission with the Federal Communications Commission.  
 53. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Verizon court explained that the duties of 
those who served the public were codified first in the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act, then the Manns-Elkins Act 
of 1910, and then in the Communications Act of 1934. Id. 
 54. See 47 U.S.C. §151 (1996). 
 55. Id. 
 56. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1996). 
 57. 47 U.S.C § 202. (1996). 
 58. See infra Part II.B. This comment is meant to supplement discussions comparing the previous 
commercially reasonable standard to the newly announced Title II classification and unreasonable interference 
standard, and to strengthen the position of the Commission as it faces challenges to its most recent 2015 Final 
Order. 
 59. 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 60. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (1976). 
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carriers would be subject to regulation. In doing so, the FCC, in the Computer II 
regime,61 determined that “basic” services would be subject to Title II regulation as 
common carriers, while “enhanced” services would not.62 “Basic” services were 
subject to common carrier regulation under Title II because they involve a “pure” 
transmission of information, and therefore could not engage in unjust or 
unreasonable discrimination in charges.63 However, “enhanced” services required 
“computer processing applications” in order to encode and control subscriber 
information services.64 Under the Computer II regime, mobile broadband services 
were viewed as enhanced information services exempt from Title II classification.65 
However, the 2015 Final Order defines mobile broadband as a commercial mobile 
service, allowing the Commission to regulate mobile broadband services under Title 
II broadband classification, and thereby sidestepping the Computer II regime’s 
distinction between basic and enhanced services.66 
However, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”) and subsequent 
FCC rulings were a key turning point for the modern internet. In Brand X,67 the 
Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s designation of broadband services as information 
service providers, thereby excluding such providers from Title II regulation.68 The 
first time the FCC explicitly endorsed regulating the various broadband providers 
under Title II was in February of 2015 with its NPRM, an endorsement codified in 
the 2015 Final Order.69 
B. The 2014 NPRM Commercially Reasonable Standard vs. The 2015 Final Order 
Unreasonable Interference or Disadvantage Standard 
The commercially reasonable standard from the 2014 NPRM was a tentative step 
toward the no unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard in the 2015 Final 
Order. The 2014 NPRM, prohibits broadband provider practices as commercially 
 61. Carolyn Malanga, California v. Federal Communications Commission: Continuing the Struggle Between 
Section 151 and 152 of the Communications Act, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 893, 895, n.11 (1991). Computer II is the 
name given to the second inquiry taken by the FCC to determine the “nature and extent of the regulatory 
jurisdiction to be applied to data processing services; and whether, under what circumstances, and subject to 
what conditions or safeguards, common carriers should be permitted to engage in data processing.” Id.  
 62. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 63. Id. at 630. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Malanga, Carolyn, California v. Federal Communications Commission: Continuing the Struggle Between 
Section 151 and 152 of the Communications Act, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 893, 898 (1991). 
 66. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,800 (proposed May 13, 2015) (to be 
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, and 20). Commercial mobile services are entities recognized as common carriers 
under Title II, and are separate from private mobile services, which are not given such recognition. Id. 
 67. Nat’l Cable & Television Ass’n v. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005). 
 68. Id. at 2691. The court noted that even though this designation seemed contrary to prior FCC policy, it 
was nonetheless a reasonable interpretation of the 1996 Act. Id. 
 69. FCC Plans Strong Hand to Regulate Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/technology/fcc-wheeler-net-neutrality.html. 
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unreasonable when, based on the totality of circumstances, allowing those practices 
would “threaten to harm internet openness and all that it protects.”70 The Cellco 
Partnership v. FCC court upheld the commercially reasonable standard as a valid 
exercise of the FCC’s authority because it did not impose common carriage 
regulation upon the broadband carriers which, at the time, were not classified as 
common carriers.71 There, the court first found that mobile data providers are not 
to be treated as common carriers under Title II.72 Cellco also found that imposing a 
“commercially reasonable practices” standard was not beyond the FCC’s regulatory 
authority because it was merely “consistent” with common carrier status, and did 
not “necessarily confer” that status upon mobile telephone companies.73 Earlier in 
the decade, the same court had held in Comcast Corp. that the FCC could not point 
to any statutory authority for requiring that broadband providers adhere to open 
network management practices.74 Therefore, by January of 2014 when the DC 
Circuit decided Verizon v. FCC,75 the court had already come down against 
regulating broadband providers as common carriers. The Verizon court found that 
because FCC had exempted broadband providers from treatment as common 
carriers by classifying mobile broadband service as a private mobile service, the 
1934 act expressly prohibited the Commission from nonetheless regulating them as 
such.76 Because the court viewed the anti- blocking and anti- discrimination rules of 
the 2010 Open Internet Order as imposing per se common carrier obligations, the 
court vacated those requirements.77 
Under the 2015 Final Order, however, the Commission rejected the 
commercially reasonable standard, and displaced the reasoning of the above 
decisions by designating mobile broadband providers not as a private mobile 
service, but instead as a commercial mobile service.78 This allows the FCC to place 
both mobile and fixed broadband services under a no unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard through Title II, thereby replacing the 
 70. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,464, (proposed May 15, 2014) (to be 
codified as 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). As a result, this standard focuses on the practices of the broadband providers with 
an eye toward generally protecting internet openness. Id. 
 71. 700 F.3d 534, 545, 548–49 (2012). The court found inter alia that the commercially reasonable standard 
“ensures providers more freedom from agency intervention than the ‘just and reasonable’ standard applicable 
to common carriers.” Id. at 548. 
 72. Id. at 538. 
 73. Id. at 547. See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (finding that, where Congress has 
expressly prohibited common carrier classification, FCC may not necessarily confer common-carrier 
obligations). 
 74. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 75. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 76. Id. at 650. The court added that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act does not offer sufficient 
statutory authority to classify broadband providers as common carriers. Id. 
 77. Id. at 659. 
 78. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,743 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified in 47 
C.F.R. pts 1, 8, and 20). 
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commercially reasonable standard proposed in the 2014 NPRM.79 In full, the rule 
states that no broadband service provider shall 
unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage (i) end users’ 
ability to select, access, and use broadband Internet access service or the 
lawful Internet content, applications, services, or devices of their choice, or 
(ii) edge providers’ ability to make lawful content, applications, services, or 
devices available to end users. Reasonable network management shall not be 
considered a violation of this rule.80 
The Commission clarified this rule by also providing a set of factors to consider 
when adjudicating case-by-case claims of unreasonableness in order to “carefully 
balance the benefits of innovation against harm to end users and edge providers.”81 
This new standard places the agency’s focus more readily on the internet user’s and 
edge provider’s experience rather than on the adequacy of  broadband provider 
practices regarding internet openness generally,82 a key difference from the 
commercially reasonable standard.83 
PART IV: ANALYSIS 
Today, our world of mobile data is changing drastically. Even before the 2015 Final 
Order, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler had publicly stated that new internet 
regulations will no longer give special treatment to mobile broadband providers and 
thereby infringe upon net neutrality principles.84 Three observations support the 
chairman’s statement and FCC’s ultimate decision to remove the mobile 
exemptions. First, the mobile broadband industry’s reasons for special treatment 
are no longer applicable in today’s world of mobile data usage.85 Second, the 
commercially reasonable standard offers no network management guidance to 
mobile broadband providers86 Finally, through the comment process following the 
 79. Id. This standard, as mentioned, was adequate for entities designated private mobile carriers, but 
Commission implicitly recognized that in order to heighten the standard above commercially reasonable, 
mobile broadband networks should be designated as commercial mobile services, or as the functional 
equivalent of such. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 19,756. 
 82. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra Part III.B. 
 84. Brian Fung, Your Mobile Data Could be Soon Covered by Net Neutrality, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/10/your-mobile-data-could-be-soon-covered-
by-net-neutrality/. Chairman Wheeler also mentioned that the Commission might reclassify broadband carriers 
under Title II. See Brooks Boliek, Alex Byers & Bill Duryea, The FCC Chair’s Internet Pivot, POLITICO (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/tom-wheeler-net-neutrality-114785.html?hp=b1_c2. 
 85. See supra Part IV.A. 
 86. See supra Part IV.B; see also Boliek, Byers & Duryea, supra note 84. 
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2014 NPRM, the FCC was able to reach a far more promising regulatory approach 
to protecting the open internet. 87 
A. The FCC Correctly Chose to Place Mobile And Wired Broadband Services Under the 
Same Regulatory Framework Because Mobile Network Growth is Changing How We 
Regulate Network Access 
Mobile networks across the United States have grown drastically. During the 2010 
debate over net neutrality, less than 30 percent of Americans had a smartphone, and 
they were using them very differently than they are using them now.88 In 2010, 
people in the U.S consumed an average of 350 megabytes of data per month 
compared to 1.2 gigabytes per month in 2013 (more than a 300% increase), when 
shared data plans emerged and more mobile devices came online.89 Additionally, the 
FCC recognizes that today about 55 percent of internet traffic is “carried over 
mobile networks,”90 and another source has noted that as early as 2013, 73.4% of 
mobile phone users accessed the internet through their devices.91 The FCC agrees 
that the commercially reasonable standard and prior lack of regulatory oversight 
was designed to allow for the “flexibility” required by such a complex system of 
connections.92 However, this complex system of mobile broadband networks 
demands the implementation of rules preservative of net neutrality precisely 
because of the potential for abuse inherent in system flexibility.93 Given the 
prevalence of mobile internet access and the technical difficulties of managing a 
mobile network, there is little reason to believe that any network management rules 
should ignore net neutrality principles as applied to mobile industry practices. 
While the 2014 NPRM addressed some of the changes in the mobile data world, the 
2015 Final Order finally recognizes that these network enhancements require 
mobile broadband regulations consistent with those applied to fixed networks.94 
 87. See supra Part IV.C. 
 88. Stacey Higginbotham, Why Google and the FCC are Bringing Mobile Back into the Net Neutrality Fight, 
GIGAOM (Sept. 13, 2014), https://gigaom.com/2014/09/13/why-google-and-the-fcc-are-bringing-mobile-back-
into-the-net-neutrality-fight/.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Fact Sheet: Chairman Wheeler Proposes New Rules, FCC (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-331869A1.pdf. 
 91. Statistics and Facts on Mobile Internet Usage, STATISTA http://www.statista.com/topics/779/mobile-
internet/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2015). 
 92. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,753 (April 13, 2015) (to be codified in 47 
C.F.R. pts 1, 8, and 20). 
 93. Steve Lohr, The Push for Net Neutrality Arose From Lack of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/technology/limited-high-speed-internet-choices-underlie-net-neutrality-
rules.html. Kevin Werbach of the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of Business points out that 
because the technology used in mobile networks can change quickly, and so it is impossible to predict what the 
“competitive landscape might look like in several years.” Id. 
 94. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,758 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified in 47 
C.F.R. pts 1, 8, and 20). 
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While the 2014 NPRM and past regulatory actions have given special treatment 
and exemptions to mobile broadband providers, the Commission made the proper 
choice in regulating mobile and fixed broadband services equally.95 As the mobile 
internet has evolved to account for an ever greater percentage of our overall internet 
experience, the reasons for granting mobile broadband providers wider authority to 
escape strict regulations have dissipated.  Even on a single smartphone, consumers 
simply switching between Wi-Fi and cellular data could be switching between 
networks subject to different network management standards.96 Therefore, the FCC 
properly decided that mobile services should be regulated by the same net neutrality 
standards as fixed broadband services because the exponential growth of mobile 
data and bandwidth availability today leave no discernible experiential consumer 
differences between mobile and wireline broadband services. 
B. The Commission Properly Rejected The 2014 NPRM’s Commercially Reasonable 
Standard Because it Offers No Network Management Guidance To Mobile Carriers As 
to How to Protect the Open Internet.  
The 2015 Final Order rejected the commercially reasonable standard espoused in 
the 2014 NPRM.97 This section anticipates challenges to that decision and thereby 
expands the Commission’s reasoning for doing so in three ways. First, the 
commercially reasonable standard is not an appropriate regulatory standard for 
internet regulation in general.98 Second, the commercially reasonable standard does 
not provide sufficient guidance for traditional mobile industry practices.99 Third, 
the commercially reasonable standard is inconsistent with net neutrality principles, 
and therefore negatively impacts competition and the end user experience.100 
1. The commercially reasonable standard is not an appropriate regulatory standard for 
internet regulation in general 
The commercially reasonable standard is, in fact, not a standard at all, but an open 
door for mobile broadband providers to restrict consumer access to the open 
internet. This is partly because the commercially reasonable standard is too broad, 
 95. See id.  
 96. Jeff Baumgartner, WiFi Offload on the Rise: Study, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.multichannel.com/news/distribution/wi-fi-offload-rise-study/260674 (pointing out that WiFi 
networks rely on wireline broadband connections). 
 97. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. at 19,758. 
 98. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 99. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 100. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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and not suitable for use in internet regulation.101 Indeed, even applied to mobile 
carriers, the standard has received a good deal of push back.102 When first applied in 
the data roaming context, wherein mobile carriers charge one another for using 
another company’s network access towers, the commercial reasonable standard was 
not helpful.103 There, T–Mobile suggested that the FCC issue a new standard for 
data roaming that judged commercial reasonableness in part by assessing whether 
the roaming charges were reasonable as compared to industry custom.104 A standard 
meant to assess the “reasonableness” of direct contractual agreements is not an 
appropriate measure to determine the manner in which the broadband providers 
implementing those agreements will “affect internet openness” from the 
consumer’s perspective.105 While consumers should get what they pay for, none 
should have to pay for services that nonetheless fail to provide that user with access 
to the open internet. 
2. The commercially reasonable standard does not provide sufficient guidance for 
traditional mobile industry practices. 
The commercially reasonable standard would not provide sufficient network 
management guidance for either of two common mobile industry practices, while 
the no unreasonable interference standard would offer far more clarity. First, 
mobile broadband providers engage in a practice known as zero-rating, which 
negates, or zeroes-out data usage for consumers that utilize certain applications 
created by edge providers that engaged in individualized bargaining with the 
broadband provider.106 Second, mobile broadband providers also engage in data 
throttling practices whereby broadband providers will reduce mobile network 
access to any users that, by some measure, use too much data in order to avoid 
 101. See Christopher Yoo, Wickard for the Internet? Network Neutrality After Verizon v. FCC, 66 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 415, 437 (2014) (adding that the commercially reasonable standard has been applied to contractual 
unconscionability claims and has been used to assess health care contracts as well). 
 102. See Patrick Campbell, T-Mobile petition seeks FCC guidance on data roaming, LEXOLOGY 
(May 30, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=db7cfc32-8ff3-41fd-9eb5-ff2ab58b878f. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. Specifically, T–Mobile asked that the FCC benchmark commercial reasonableness by determining: 
(1) whether wholesale roaming rates offered to retail competitors exceed relevant retail rates; (2) whether a 
wholesale roaming rate offered to a competitor  “substantially exceeds the roaming rates charged to foreign 
carriers” whose customers roam in the U.S.; (3) whether a  wholesale roaming rate exceeds the wholesale rate 
charged to mobile virtual network operators; and (4) how the proposed  wholesale roaming rate compares to 
other competitively negotiated wholesale rates. Id. FCC did not accept this new definition, however. Id. 
 105. Am. Library Ass’n, Reply Comments to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Matter of Protecting and 
Promoting the Open Internet (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.ala.org/offices/sites/ala.org.offices/files/content/Library-
HigherEd%20NN%20Reply%20comments%20Final%20Sept%2015%202014.pdf. 
 106. JEFFREY EISENACH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, THE ECONOMICS OF ZERO RATING (2015), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/EconomicsofZeroRating.pdf. As a result, consumers 
do not have to pay for the data used in accessing that content because the content provider has already paid the 
broadband provider for that access. Id. 
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higher transmission costs and slower network speeds across the board.107 This 
analysis specifically addresses the FCC’s proper decision to reject the less protective 
commercially reasonable standard in favor of the no unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard.108 
In response to worldwide growth in mobile data networks, Facebook and Google 
have begun “zero-rating” programs, which eliminate a consumer’s cost of using 
data to access a particular content provider, in emerging markets where access to 
the internet is achieved almost exclusively through mobile devices.109 However, 
these practices would not be effectively regulated by a commercially reasonable 
standard. Because internet access can be limited in these parts of the world, these 
zero–rating programs often come along with consolidated use packages, which give 
consumers access to web sites like Facebook or Google to perform a wide variety of 
specific tasks such as search for jobs or conduct small business activities.110 These 
consolidated use packages actually resemble earlier efforts in American network 
management practices to corner internet use to one brand of service, such as with 
CompuServe and America Online.111 Notably, these experiments in “walled-in” 
broadband management eventually failed, in large part because the open internet 
won out by keeping low barriers to entry for incoming startups such as Google.112 
In the U.S., zero-rating involves mobile broadband networks113 allowing 
application content providers to offer services to end users without those users 
incurring data charges, effectively zeroing out that users’ data usage.114 Zero-rating is 
the mobile broadband industry’s equivalent to paid prioritization in wired 
networks, where content providers like Netflix pay broadband networks for better 
 107. Mark Sullivan, What Happens When You Get ‘Throttled’, PCWORLD, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/251008/what_happens_when_you_get_throttled_.html (last visited Dec. 13, 
2015). 
 108. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,758 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified in 47 
C.F.R. pts 1, 8, and 20). 
 109. Alicia Levine, Facebook and Google’s Race to Zero, MEDIUM (Mar. 22, 2014), 
https://medium.com/@alicialev/facebook-and-googles-race-to-zero-7136fc3e5925. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Mathew Ingram, Open vs. Closed: What Kind of Internet Do We Want?, GIGAOM (Mar. 23, 2012), 
https://gigaom.com/2012/03/23/open-vs-closed-what-kind-of-internet-do-we-want/. 
 112. Id. See also Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,848 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be 
codified in 47 C.F.R. pts 1, 8, and 20). While it is unclear whether the commercially reasonable standard under 
the 2014 NPRM would have provided sufficient protection against consolidated use packaging, the 2015 Final 
Order could place an effective ban on those practices as the Commission may likely view forcing consumers to 
access the internet through one content provider as “unreasonably interfer[ing]” with the end user’s ability to 
“select. . . the lawful internet content of their choice.” Id. 
 113. See AT&T Sponsored Data, 
http://www.att.com/att/sponsoreddata/en/index.html#fbid=HwHkXCEPyp_ (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 114. Matthew Shears, Net Neutrality, Zero- Rating & Development: What’s the Data?, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY 
AND TECH., https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2014/index.php/proposal/view_public/208 (last visited Dec. 
13, 2015). 
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or faster access to customers.115 Also known as sponsored data plans, zero rating 
hurts consumers because it allows providers to create artificial scarcity of choice and 
“corrupt the growth of online services.”116 While some observers have argued that 
certain mobile network blocking programs do not infringe upon net neutrality 
principles for mobile internet,117 those arguments ignore the FCC’s recent shift 
toward offering equal regulatory treatment for mobile wired and mobile broadband 
services.118 Americans deserve a clearer, more stringent standard that does not wait 
until millions of consumers lose access to the open internet before doing anything 
to curb those practices. 
As millions of mobile customers have discovered in recent years, some mobile 
broadband providers throttle or reduce end user access to mobile networks if a user 
exceeds a certain level of data usage.119 In fact, Verizon began throttling those 
customers with unlimited data plans,120 sparking concern among industry groups 
and the FCC.121 Problematically for some broadband providers, the internet is 
experiencing a great deal of growth, and content providers like Netflix are hogging 
the bandwidth available to end users.122 To ease that burden in the past, zero-rating 
and data throttling seemed to be good practices for mobile providers, and in some 
instances may have indeed preserved bandwidth for some mobile consumers.123 
However, the commercially reasonable standard focuses on evaluating whether a 
broadband provider’s practices are commercially reasonable, and would not help 
evaluate the issue of  why data throttling practices would be meaningful for 
consumer access, nor would it explain whether they comport with general 
neutrality principles of preserving the open internet. 
 115. Robert Bachle, FCC Proposal Means Two Speeds for Ads Online Not Just Content, ADAGE (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/paid-prioritization-threaten-net-neutrality/296623/. 
 116. Gautham Nagesh, Mobile Networks Caught in the Open Internet Debate, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/net-neutrality-heats-up-again-over-mobile-data-1410905961. 
 117. David Kravets, Holding FaceTime hostage is No Net Neutrality Breach, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/2012/08/facetime-net-neutrality-flap/. 
 118. Gautham Nagesh, Mobile Networks Caught in the Open Internet Debate, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/net-neutrality-heats-up-again-over-mobile-data-1410905961 (discussing the FCC 
Chairman’s recent proposal to subject mobile broadband to the proposed open internet rules). 
 119. Adriana Lee, How All the Major US Carriers Throttle Your Mobile Data, READWRITE (Aug. 5, 2014) 
http://readwrite.com/2014/08/05/verizon-unlimited-data-throttling-irks-fcc. 
 120. Explanation of Video Optimization Deployment, VERIZONMOBILE, 
http://www.verizonmobile.com/support/network-optimization/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2015). 
 121. Adriana Lee, Thanks, Verizon! Now The FCC Is Asking All Carriers About Data Throttling, READWRITE, 
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://readwrite.com/2014/08/08/fcc-verizon-data-throttling-att-sprint-tmobile. 
 122. Todd Spangler, Netflix Bandwidth Usage Climbs to Nearly 37% of Internet Traffic at Peak Hours, 
VARIETY (May 28, 2015), http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/netflix-bandwidth-usage-internet-traffic-
1201507187/. For instance, Netflix actually accounts for nearly 37% of internet bandwidth usage during peak 
hours. Id. 
 123. Explanation of Video Optimization Deployment, VERIZONMOBILE, 
http://www.verizonmobile.com/support/network-optimization/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2015). 
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3. The commercially reasonable standard is inconsistent with net neutrality principles, 
and therefore negatively impacts competition and the end user experience 
Some scholars predicted that the commercially reasonable standard would promote 
healthy competition among broadband companies by encouraging “strategic 
alliances” between content and broadband providers through individualized 
bargaining.124 However, according to many of those scholars, strategic alliances 
involving zero-rating and geographic caching are only effective when practiced by 
firms with a small market share, and even that assumption rests on shaky 
reasoning.125 Unfortunately the mobile broadband sector in the United States 
consists primarily of firms with a large market share.126 The commercially 
reasonable standard fails to draw a line between what kinds of companies can 
engage in which commercial activities, and only asks courts on a case-by-case basis 
to determine, given the totality of the circumstances, whether an activity is 
“commercially reasonable.”127 Therefore, there is no way to ensure that only firms 
small enough to benefit market competition will engage in individualized 
bargaining to achieve strategic alliances with content providers. 
Some scholars also believe that the commercially reasonable standard protects 
consumer interests because it recognizes cost sensitivities for end users, and that 
consumers are willing to give up flexibility for cost benefits.128 However, this 
assumption relies on the idea that consumers are willing to be narrowed into 
choosing broadband or edge providers that have made specialized access dealings 
for that type of consumer.129 Of course, this is not the recognized policy of the 
Executive branch or of the FCC.130 Therefore, there is no reason to view the 
commercially reasonable standard as protective of consumer interests or 
innovations in broadband internet. 
 124. See Yoo, supra note 101 (arguing that when those managing technologies that can affect entire 
economies do not take full advantage of its market potential, “strategic alliances” such as those here are the best 
way to mitigate the resulting market failure). 
 125. Roslyn Layton, Zero Rating: Who Bears the Cost of Bans?, TECHPOLICYDAILY (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/internet/zero-rating-cost-of-bans/. 
 126. Including Comcast, which comprises about one half of the mobile broadband market. See Jon Brodkin, 
Comcast Now Has More Than Half of All US Broadband, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/01/comcast-now-has-more-than-half-of-all-us-broadband-customers/. 
 127. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,470-471 (proposed July 1, 2014) (to be 
codified as 47 C.F.R. pt. 8). 
 128. See Yoo, supra note 101, at 449. 
 129. Id. at 440. 
 130. See Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, supra note 1; see also Statement 
by FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler on the FCC’s Open Internet Rules, FCC.GOV (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/statement-fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-fccs-open-internet-rules. Together, these 
policy statements recognize the consumer’s right to choose between content providers through the open 
internet. Id. 
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C. Comments to the 2014 NPRM Properly Informed the Commission’s Regulatory 
Approach in the 2015 Order 
Even though the 2014 NPRM did not put forth regulatory standards sufficient to 
preserve net neutrality, the FCC had a great number of public comments to help 
determine what other regulatory options might better provide consumers with an 
open internet experience.131 The “no unreasonable interference/disadvantage 
standard” is a result of the FCC’s consideration of those comments, and properly 
addresses some of the problems with a commercially reasonable standard discussed 
above.132 
One comment in particular, presented by the Center for Democracy and 
Technology (“CDT”),133 proposed a standard for network management that 
optimizes the advantages of net neutrality principles and tempers power abuse 
among mobile broadband providers without stifling the kind of innovation and 
network efficiency that has brought the internet to where it is today.134 The CDT 
maintains that a practice violates a standard “‘consistent with internet openness’ if 
substantial adoption of that practice would tend to undermine” internet subscriber 
access to lawful internet content, services and devices without interference, or 
developer access to content, devices, and internet uses without negotiate 
agreements.135 The CDT’s standard comports with and informs the 2015 Final 
Order because each are explicitly tailored to deal with problems arising in consumer 
and developer access to the open internet.136 While the CDT’s standard is useful in 
that it does not necessarily require Title II classification of broadband internet 
providers generally, the FCC’s solution to use Title II strengthens its ability to 
enforce the higher standard. 
More specifically, the CDT’s standard falls in line with the Verizon, Cellco, and 
Midwest Video cases drawing a line in the sand between what constitutes common 
carrier regulatory practices and what does not.137 Indeed, the court’s decision in 
Verizon struck down the anti-discrimination rule, making room for 
implementation of the CDT standard, and still preserving net neutrality 
principles.138 The Verizon and Cellco courts together establish that, absent common 
 131. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,756 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified as 47 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, and 20). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Protecting and 
Promoting the Open Internet, (2014), https://d1ovv0c9tw0h0c.cloudfront.net/files/2014/09/FCC-Reply-
Comments-Open-Internet.pdf. 
 134. Id. at 3. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 2–3. 
 137. See supra Part III.B. 
 138. See supra Part III.A.; see also Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 652, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Cellco P’ship v. 
FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 545, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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carrier classification under Title II, mobile broadband carriers must not be 
regulated in a manner that necessarily treats them as such, but may be regulated in a 
manner consistent with common carrier regulation.139 The CDT’s standard similarly 
does not rely on mobile broadband networks being designated a commercial mobile 
service under Title II’s definition. 
While the CDT standard offers a marked improvement over the commercially 
reasonable standard, the FCC’s 2015 Final Order went further and classified 
broadband services generally under Title II.140 This ruling allows the FCC to more 
vehemently deny broadband providers’ efforts to discriminate against content 
providers that do not pay for greater access to end users on the network; exactly the 
kind of regulatory practice that was denied in Verizon.141 Specifically, the 2015 Final 
Order implements a no blocking, no throttling, and no paid prioritization rules for 
both mobile and fixed broadband providers.142 The 2015 Final Order addresses 
exactly what the commercially reasonable standard could not offer: “a known 
standard by which to determine whether new practices are appropriate or not.”143 
Moreover, the FCC has implemented a new process by which it can field complaints 
from content providers and end users, giving quicker access to relief from anti-
neutrality network management practices.144 Finally, the FCC’s 2015 Final Order 
leaves room for innovation and investment by allowing networks to continue 
setting rates for internet access,145 perhaps contributing to the reason for the spike in 
stock values after the Chairman’s announcement.146 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
The FCC properly rejected the commercially reasonable standard of the 2014 
NPRM with regard to mobile broadband network management because it does not 
sufficiently balance net neutrality principles with the need for flexibility and 
marketplace innovation.147 In fielding potential challenges to its 2015 Final Order, 
the Commission may consider the additional arguments presented here against 
reverting to a commercially reasonable standard. The commercially reasonable 
 139. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659 (holding that the commission failed to establish that the anti-
discrimination and anti- blocking rules do not impose per se common carrier obligations). 
 140. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. at 19,738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified as 
47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, and 20). 
 141. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659; see also Boliek, Byers, & Duryea, supra note 84. 
 142. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. at 19,740. 
 143. Fact Sheet: Chairman Wheeler Proposes New Rules for Protecting the Open Internet, FCC.GOV (Feb. 4, 
2014), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0204/DOC-331869A1.pdf. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. See also Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. at 19,738. 
 146. Joan McCarter, Telecom Stocks Soar after Wheeler Announces Net Neutrality Proposal, DAILY KOS (Feb. 
5, 2015), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/02/05/1362569/-Telecom-stocks-soar-after-Wheeler-announces-
net-neutrality-proposal. 
 147. See supra Part IV. 
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standard does not protect against the threat of common practices such as zero-
rating and data throttling that shut out consumer access to the various networks.148 
Moreover, the standard does not foster the innovation and investment necessary to 
put the consumers’ individual experience on equal footing across mobile and fixed 
platforms, as does the 2015 Final Order.149 The FCC now faces challenges to its 2015 
Final Order, however, and may defend its Order with the following. 
First, mobile broadband providers should not be exempt from regulation that 
preserves net neutrality principles.150 Every day, more and more Americans access 
the internet from a cellular device using mobile networks.151 Second, even if the 
commercially reasonable standard originally offered by the FCC to cover fixed 
broadband providers were extended to mobile broadband providers, the regulatory 
program would not achieve the goal of regulating mobile broadband providers with 
concern for net neutrality principles.152 Finally, the FCC has proposed a standard 
that achieves these goals without infringing upon innovative practices, or end user 
access to the open internet.153 This standard is better because it specifically addresses 
the user’s internet experience across the board, and is likely to result in more 
consistent policy in both fixed and mobile networks.154 
Without appropriate regulatory policy that preserves end user access to the open 
internet, the internet as we know it would change forever. Concerned about this 
possibility, Americans have surely done their part to voice their opinions in 
dramatic fashion.155 If the FCC is truly committed to protecting and preserving the 
open internet, they should defend the 2015 Final Order’s decision to reject the 
commercially reasonable standard in favor of a more stringent no unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard. 
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